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John D. Morrison 
Heidegger, COITespondence Truth 
and the Realist Theology of 
Thomas Forsyth TOlTance 
Once known, Truths acquire a utilitarian crust; they no longer 
interest us as truths but as useful recipes. That pure, sudden 
illumination which characterizes truth accompanies the latter only at 
the moment of discovery. Hence its Greek name aletheia, which 
origtnally meant the same as the word apocalypsis later, that is, 
discovery, revelation, or rather, unveiling, removing a veil or cover.1 
Ortega y Gasset 
The concept of truth enshrines at once the real being of things and 
the revelation of things as they are in reality. The truth of being 
comes to bear in its own light and in its own authority, constraining 
us by the power of what it is to assent to it and acknowledge it for 
what it is in itself. 5t Anselm who developed that further in a more 
realist way held truth to be the reality of things as they actually are 
independent of us before God and therefore as they ought to he 
known and signified by us. Everything is what it actually is and not 
something else and cannot according to its nature be other than it is. 
That is what he called its inherent 'necessity" or 'truth.'2 
Thomas F. Torrance 
I. Introduction 
The question and nature of truth has long been at the heart of 
philosophical ConCenl at various levels and within and between 
schools of thought and method·. Truth as 'correspondence,' 
however that has been construed historically, has remained at 
the center among the major competing views on the nature of 
truth. It has been called by some the 'common-sense' perspect-
ive. Yet in the last two centuries it has faced, as have emphases on 
1 Jose Ortega y Gas.set, Meditations on Qui.rote, trans. E. Rugg and D. Marin 
(New York: Norton, 1961) p. 67. 
• Thomas F. Torrance, Reality and Scientific ~ (Edinburgh: The Scottish 
Academic Pre.., 1961), p. 141, Hereafter RST. 
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(critical) realist knowledge of the world, much negative re-
sponse.' In the twentieth centuIy such antagonism has arisen not 
only from among neo-Kantians and some analytical philosophers 
but from philosophers influenced by the thought of Martin 
Heidegger. It has been commonplace in some quarters to identifY 
Heidegger's understanding of truth as 'disclosure' or 'uncovering' 
(a-letheia) as an overthrowing of the old, static, constrictive 
correspondence notions of truth. But this is not in fact what 
Heidegger has expressed. In fact his point is to support or 
undergird correspondence truth by his emphasis on disclosure. It 
is this interpretation of Heidegger which Reformed Christian 
theolOgian Thomas Torrance carefully appropriates for his own 
discussions of the Truth of God disclosed in his Word-thus his 
emphases on both correspondence and coherence truth, and on 
critical realism. 
II. COJTeSpondence Truth: Some Classical Expressions 
In the process of examining Martin Heidegger's apparently 
negative response to 'correspondence theories' of truth, it is 
necessary that one see clearly that against which Heidegger is 
responding. For that reason we will examine briefly what are 
often regarded as three 'classical' formulations of correspond-
ence truth in the Western tradition: the Platonic, the Aristotelian 
and the Thomistic. In the words of Richard Rorly, these three are 
all found (rightly or wrongly) to fall within the paradigm of 'the 
mind as a great mirror, containing various representations-
some accurate, some not-and capable of being studied by pure, 
nonempirical methods. '4 
Plato's understanding of correspondence truth is said to be 
covertly developed in the Republic, with the first explicit formula-
tions of a correspondence theory to he found in the Sophist and 
the Theaetetus. Yet even here Plato seems to reflect some 
hesitation about it. In the Sophist, truth as correspondence is 
pres~ted ~ relation to basic inst~ces of human judgment 
illvolvmg direct perceptual apprehenslon of the current condition 
of a particular given. Regarding the truth or falsity of statements, 
3 In contrast to naive realism, critical realism, as Torrance understands it, seeks 
knowledge of and correction by the external fuct of the object, 'the truth of 
thin$. J 'Ihe mind must be yielded to and tested by the object as it discloses 
itsell: 'This is set against a dualism which would separate object from 
knower. 
, Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the MirTOr of Nature (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1979), p. 12. 
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'the true one states about you the things that are as they are,' and 
'the faIse statement states about you things different from the 
things that are.'5 While the dialogue questions the human 
capacity to know what is real and what is unreal at several 
points, the Stranger proposes a definition of 'real being' as that 
which is constituted so as to 'possess any sort of power either to 
affect anything else or to he affected.'" But if knowing is an 
'acting upon' the object known, then to he known is to be 
changed. But this cannot occur in that which is changeless.' But 
Plato, throu~ the Stranger, is not asserting that reality is only the 
'changeless, that which cannot he acted upon by the knower. 
Rather, as he later asserts, reality is comprised of both 'all that is 
changeless and all that is in change.'8 But in the Sophist, Plato's 
arguments are not brought to resolution in relation to presenta-
tions of truth as correspondence. Correspondence theory is here 
qualified by attendant arguments which question the simplicity 
or self-evidence of perceptual givens as static realities which can 
be 'read off the surface.' 
Similar {,oints are developed in the Theaetetus where Socrates 
says that things are not given in themselves but rather 'for each 
other,' i.e., 'whether we speak of something's 'being' or its 
'becoming,' we must speak of it as being or becoming for 
someone, or of something, or toward something.'" He then 
develops the argument that 'agent' and 'patient' are relative to 
each other, which raises the problem of relativism, that 'what 
every man believes as a result of perception is ... true for him.' 
To avoid this, Socrates turns the argument away from perception 
to the mental operations involved in perceptuaIly grounded 
judgments. Knowledge occurs on a level that is as much mental 
as perceptual, as shown by knowledge based on memory, 
knowledge of a fact not even present to the senses and thus 
de,!"ed not from sense experience but from mental operations 
which transcend such (as in mathematics). Along simllar lines, 
~ates finally ~oncludes that :we must not look for (knowledge) 
ill sense perception at all, but ill what goes on when the mind is 
5 Plato, Sophist 236a, trans. P.M. Comfocd, Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith 
Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1961), pp. 957-1085. 
6 lbid., p. 247e. 
7 Ibid., p. 248e. 
• ibid., p. 249d. 
9 Plato, Theaetetus l6Oc, trans. F.M. Cornford, CoUected Dialogues (Princeton: 
Princeton University Pre.s, 1961), pp. 845-919. 
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occupied with things by itseI£ '10 Having thus problematically 
transferred truth to the level of mental operations, he asserts that 
~~ and no! knowing ?I"e identical to being and not being, 
I.e., one who thinks w/wJ; IS rwt about anything cannot but be 
thinking what is false,'11 again, a simple form of correspondence 
theory. Yet, again, counter arguments are raised here in relation 
to the notion of falsehood. It would seem that Plato's early 
description of correspondence truth leaves much that is 
unresolved. 
Aristotle's version of truth as correspondence, as found in the 
Metaphysics, is not qualified in context in the way Plato does 
with his version. While discussing the law of the excluded middle, 
he makes the following clear definition of truth as correspond-
ence: 'To say that what is is, and that what is not is not, is true; 
and therefore also he who says that a thing is or is not will say 
either what is true or what is false.''' This definition again seems· 
limited by the context to clear cut instances of a correspondence 
between a mental reflection and particular perceptual objects. A 
middle ground in which things can be understood in more than 
one way and in which changes of judgement can occur is 
excluded, greatly limiting the applicability of Aristotle's definition 
of truth.'3 Like Plato in tlie Sophist, Aristotle seems to transfer the 
problem of truth from the level of sense perceptions alone to·an 
operation 'in thought.' Hence, Aristotle maintains that truth is 
grounded upon the capacity of the mind to make judgments and, 
thereby, statements about what is and what is not, and to relate 
these statements by combinations and separation to particular 
perceptual experiences." In the NlComachean Ethics Aristotle 
places his notion of correspondence truth into a wider context. 
He asserts that 'there are three elements in the soul which control 
action and the attainment of truth: namely, Sensations, Intellect 
(rwus), and Desire.'15 In relation to these three elements, the 
theory of correspondence, as described in the Metaphysics, is 
held to be adequate only to the 'truth of intellect.' 
St Thomas Aquinas gives much attention to a theory of truth as 
correspondence following the Aristotelian model. But here Aris-
10 Ibid., 187a. 
11 Ibid. 188d. 
12 Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.7.1, trans. Hugb Tredennick (New York: G.P. Put-
man's Sons, 1933) (Loeb ed., pp. 199--201). 
13 Ibid. 4.6.8. 
14 Ibid. 6.4.3. 
15 ~totle, Nicomachian Ethics 62.1, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge: Harvard 
Universi1y Press, 1962) (Loeb ed., pp. 327-329). 
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totle's correspondence theory of truth undergoes something of a 
division or bifurcation because of Thomas' theological position. 
He starts with a problem posed by the understanding oJ truth as 
based on the intelligible grasping of sensible forms. In response to 
Augustine's view that truth is in the mind, he endeavors to 
resolve the contradiction by first contrasting truth or knowledge 
with desire. The goal (end) of desire, which is the good, is in the 
thing destred while the 'end or term of knowledge, which is truth, 
is in the mind,' i.e., while the direction of desire is outward to the 
thing, the direction of knowledge is rather from the thing to the 
mind.'· This is because the referent of knowledge is the experi-
ence of truth, which is not given in the thing itselfbut is a mental 
phenomenon. Thus Thomas largely agrees with Aristotle, while 
also developing Aristotle's thought on truth as correspondence. 
While Thomas' resolution of the problem arising from the . 
existence of objects that are not presently standing in perceptual 
relation to the knower in the differentiation between human and 
divine intellects is of interest and could further illustrate the 
points previously made, it is of little use for our purposes 
here. 17 
m. Martin Heidegger's Apparent Negation of 
'CoITeSpondence Truth' and Truth as 'Disclosnre' 
In Being and Time, and less directly in 'On the Essence of Truth,' 
Martin Heidegger seems highly critical of correspondence the-
ories of truth which, he says, are determined by 'the kind of 
relation that obtains between the statement and the thing. '18 Most 
expoSitions of Heidegger's influential understanding of a-letheia 
(as 'unveiling', 'unhiddenness' or 'dis-closure' which occurs in 
the mode of relationality in the context of human existence in the 
world) regard his position as one which casts off or overthrows 
correspondence notions of truth in relation to objective reality. 
This is a position or interpretation often taken, assumed and 
repeated by, e.g., W. Kaufinan, F. Olafson, T. Langar, M. Grene, 
M. Gelven, W. Richardson, W. Macomber,). Rouse, M. Okrent and 
). Macquarrie and especially in the analytical tradition. In his 
16 St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae la. 16. 1, trans. Thomas GomaIl, SJ. 
(New York.: McGraw-Hill, 1564), 4::75. 
" Ibid. The discussion oOamesJ. Dicenso has been helpful at several points. Cf. 
below. 
" Martin Heldegger, 'On tiIe Essence of Truth,' Basic Wrl~ of Martin 
~ (New York: Halper and Row, Publishers, 1977), p. 123. Hereafter 
BW. 
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influential philosophical hermeneutics, Anthony Thiselton has 
developed and analyzed at length the existential ontology of 
Martin Heidegger and the effects ofhis thought upon contempor-
ary questions of interpretation. Thiselton is quite typical when, 
with regard to Heidegger's assessment of correspondence truth, 
he states that 
Heidegger repeatedly urges that we must avoid anything which 
suggests a correspondence theory of truth ... This apProaCh to the 
question of 'reality' naturally leads on to Heidegger's rejection of a 
correspondence view of truth ... 'Representations' (VorsteUungen) 
do not get compared ... What is to be demonstrated is solely the 
being-uncovered of the entity itself . • • Hence he (Heidegger j can 
never he satisfied with a correspondence view of truth which locates 
truth in terms of relationships between concepts 'in the mind' and 
'reality out there.''' 
A simiIar recent example of such an interpretation of Heidegger 
is found within James J. Dicenso's larger discussion of Heiaeg-
ger's ontological emphasis on truth as disclosure. He understands 
Heidegger's position to be one which stands in marked and 
critical-contrast to the grouping of views classified as 'cor-
respondence theories of truth'-'disclosure' is found to stand 
outside of and over against 'correspondence.' He says, 
A1etheia, Heidegger argues, means 'unhiddenness,' and this tells us 
something about the nature of truth . . . Heidegger introduces the 
argument for truth as disclosure by indicating the limitations of 
correspondence theories .. . Modes of relatlonality, or being open, 
antecede any specific and detenninable existential encounter or 
experience. That is, the open region is a necessary dimension of the 
human capacity to relate hermeneuticaIly to a world and to others 
and hence to have any form of experience ... Heidegger's argument 
is that prior to any possible experience of truth as corresponaence of 
entity and idea there must he a constitutive region of disclosure that 
informs the specific mode of apprehension of the given ... no 
judgment ... is purely objective and context free.2O 
Dicenso's ensuing discussion interprets Heidegger's emphasis on 
'disclosure' truth to be one of relegation of correspondence truth 
(if not, in fact, negating it finally) to a place of very minor 
19 Anthony C. 1hiselton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Henneneutics and 
Philosophical Description with Special Rej'fffeflCe to He~, Bultmann, 
Gadamer, and ~n (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1980), pp. 151, 174, 199. 
'" James J. DiCenso, Hermeneotics and the Disclosore of Truth: A Study in the 
Work of Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur (Charlottesville, Va: The University 
Pre .. of Vu-ginia. 1990), pp. 56--M. 
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usefulness for the question and contexts of truth because of its 
static and oppressive nature. Indeed, it is true that Heidegger 
does often speak in very negative terms in reference to the 
correspondence theory of truth, i.e., that the correspondence 
notion makes 'truth' into a thing, that it 'ossifies' truth within 
notions of confonnity and agreement (adequatio intellectus eI 
rei) and thereby 'covers over'the ontolOgical reality of Truth.21 
But are Thiselton's and Dicenso's (el. al.) interpretations of 
Heidegger as one who has endeavored essentially to push aside 
or overthrow correspondence truth accurate? Is Martin Heideg-
ger's understanding of Truth (aletheia) as 'disclosure' such that 
any real sense of correspondence truth is all but cast out as a 
viable understanding of truth? 
Iv. Heldegger, 'Disclosure,' and 'Correspondence' Truth: An 
Analysis of Being and Time 
The opening quotation from Ortega y Gasset anticipates several 
of the questions and issues which Martin Heidegger subsequently 
developed, including his particular etymological concern for the 
Greek term aletheia. A/etheia became a means whereby, in the 
pursuit of Sein or 'Being -as-such,' he explicated the disclosive 
dimension (as the ontological dimension, i.e., more original) of 
Truth. In this Dicenso must be recognized as at least partly 
correct when he pointed out the 'prior-ness' of Truth as 
disclosure to any other 'ontic' questions or positions on the 
nature of truth. While our focus herein will be given to the pivotal 
forty-fourth section ('1144) of Being and Time, it being Heidegger's 
most developed expression of ' truth as disclosure,' this discussion 
must be prepared for by a preIirninary unfolding of context and 
argument.'"' 
Section forty-four is the cuhnination and conclusion ofthe first 
of the two major divisions of Being and Time (the promised 
'third' part was never done). Division one is a preIirninary 
analysis of the 'being ofDasein' (the 'being-there' of the existing 
person) as 'being-in-the-world' in all of its that-ness or facticity 
(Gewoifenheit). In his endeavor to 'uncover' the meaning of 
Dasein, Heidegger argues forcefully stage by stage to make clear 
that the being ofDasein is Care (Sor;ge), that the meaning of the 
21 Martin Hei.degger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (New York: HaJper and Row, Publishers, 1962), pp. 257-:!67 and 
BW, pp. 119-122. 
" Ibid., pp. 256-273. 
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being of Care is Temporalily (Zeitlichkeit) via Resoluteness in the 
face of death. This is intended to lead through and beyond the 
phenomenological analysis of Dasein, thrOugh 'being-unto-
death' (&in zum Tode, Selbstiindigkeit), to the Horizon of Being-
as-such, which is the condition of the meaning of the being of 
Dasein. In the development of Heidegger's argument and trans-
ition from the meaning of Dasein (Division One) to the meaning 
of Being (Division Two), the phenomenon of truth is of increasing 
significance and in the process the association or relation 
between 'Being' (Sein) or 'Is-ness' and 'Truth' (Wahrheit, al-
etheia) becomes one of near interchangeabilily (cf. below). 
Discussions preliminary and preparatory to '1144, 'Dasein, 
Disclosedness, and Truth,' can be found directly and indirectly 
throughout Being and Time. But two sections, '116 and '1139, stand 
out as of particular importance and relevance as conceptual 
background to '1144. Section 6 describes 'the task of a Destruk-
tion / Deconstruction of the history of ontology' and bas ob-
viously bad great influence upon recent philosophical and radical 
theological developments.23 In t,,!s brief discussion of the ~eed to 
disassemble, so to speak, the history and, thus, the static and 
'veiled' notions of Being in Western ontology in order to 'arrive' at 
the original 'disclosure' or 'revelation' of Being in the pre-
Socratics (e.g., Parmenides, 'making present'), Heidegger pre-
sents a brietbut most Significant study of the word 10gos.24 As 
Heidegger states the point, 
Legein is the clue for arriving at those structures of being which 
belong to the entities we encounter in addressing olU'Se1.ves to 
anything or speaking about it .,. As the ontological clue gets 
progressively worked out-namely, in the hermeneutic of the logos-
it becomes increasingly possible to grasp the problem of Being in a 
more radical fashion ... Legein itself-or rather noein, that simple 
awareness of something present-ai-hand (Vorhandenheit) ... has 
the Temporal structure of a pure 'making-present' of something. 
Those entities (Das Seiende) which show (pfUiino as making present) 
themselves in this and for it, and which are understood as entities in 
23 The discussion of deconstruction/Destruktion in section six is, though brief, 
Heidegger's attempt to 'dig' back through the layers of the history and 
development ofWestem ontology in the hope of thereby laying hold again of 
the 'original' revelation of Being (&in) as given to the pre-socratics (particu-
larly Pannenides) before subsequent devefopments robbed the concept of its 
dynamic qualities. Heidegger desires that by such a clearing process, or rather 
the 'in-covering' of the original revelation of Being. that re-construction of the 
Western tradition can then be pursued properly. 
24 Heidegger. BT. pp 4-7, 48. 
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the most authentic sense, thus get interpreted with yd to the 
Present; that is, they are conceived as presence (ousia). 
Logos is understood then as letting something be seen, a showing 
or making manifest the entily about which one is speaking. But 
this making manifest or showing must be don~ in such a way that 
it is thereby taken out of its hiddenness to let it be seen or known 
as unhidden or dis-closed. 
In '1139, Heidegger is attempting to make the extended (though 
ultimately unsuccessful) transition from Dasein to &in. Therein 
he explains that any entily is what it is independently of anyone's 
experience of it as such or not. But he also states that there is no 
Being except in the understanding of that being having under-
standing of something like Being ('those to whose being some-
thing like an understanding of Being belongs'), i.e., Dasein. Being 
'is' lSein isO only so long as there is any being having the 
understanding of something like Being (in contrast to 'entities')." 
This is not intended to be reflective of some neo-Kantian 
subjectivily, but is intended interestingly in the Cartesian sense. 
This is not an alignment wtth Descartes' substance metaphysics 
but wtth what Heidegger takes to be his true discovery of, or the 
'un-covering' of, that which bad been lost or covered by 
traditional concepts, 'subject-ivity' (cf. 'II 6). Being is that element 
in ajudgment, expressed in a copula, which connects ajud!(ment 
to an oDject (i.e., S is P, the Leaf is green). But wtthout beings 
who understand (verstehen) or can make such 'connection' there 
would be as such no Being, no Truth (the 'wbat is' ofsomethinJO. 
So contra entities (Seiendes) Being CSein) only appears in the 
understanding CVerstiindnis) of such entities. In the under-
standing of Dasein is the 'place' where Being occurs. Or, to put 
that another way, Being exists as the understanding of Being (by 
Dasein). In such expression of Being as the 'letting be as is,' 
Heidegger explicitly established the connection, indeed the iden-
tily, iii Being and Truth." Upon such bases of argument, 
Heidegger brings out the full import of his understanding of 
'Truth as Disclosure' and the question or questionabilily of 'truth 
as correspondence' in 1144. 
At the opening of this section, Heidegger reflects positively on 
the fact that Western philosophy from the pre-Socratics has 
associated truth and Being, Being and thinking. Indeed, Par-
menides 'identified Being wtth the perceptive understanding of 
" Ibid. 
.. Ibid., p. 228. 
.:17 Ibid. 
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Being.' From such a basis the 'traditional' concept of truth (i.e., 
'correspondence') bas emerged and taken varied forms as 
reflected in three theses: first, the place of truth is assertion! 
judgment; second, that the essence of truth lies in the 'agree-
ment' of ju~ement with its object (adequntio intel1ectus et rei); 
third, Aristotle's assignment of truth to judgment as 'agreement' 
in the sense that in the experiences of the soul its 'representa-
tions' (noemata) are likenings to things.28 As this third form was 
developed it became the basis of the Latin (as well as Jewish and 
Arabic) formulation of Truth. Against the neo-Kantians, Heideg-
ger points out that Kant too assumed the correspondence theory 
of truth, i.e., truth as agreement of knowledge with its object. But 
all of this leads him to the question of what is implicitly posited in 
the relational totality (understan~owledge and thing) of 
correspondence? In the relation of agreement' (adequntio or 
correspondentia), in wbat is the 'agreement' to be found between 
the understanding and the thing? Is it a relation between real 
psychical process and Ideal content? There is a relation but is it 
one of correspondence or something else? A coin and a statement 
about it are obviously not identical Heidegger is thus led to ask 
what the traditional correspondence reration 'reveals' onto-
logically. It is fauna that advancement can only be made by 
making visible or present the necessity of cIari:f}'ing 
... the kind of Being which belongs to knowledge itself .•. try to 
bring to view a phenomenon which is characteristic of knowledge-
the phenomenon of truth. When does truth become phenomenally 
explicit in knowledge itself? It does so when such knowing demon-
strates itself as true. By demonstrating itself il is assured of its 
truth."" 
In other words, what kind of 'Being' is knowing? In this 
phenomenal context of 'demonstration,' '~ement' must be-
come 'visible,' truth must become 'explicit. The human act of 
knowing is that which brings truth into being in the sense that to 
know truth (truly) is to know the thing in suen a way that it is 'let' 
or 'allowed' to be on its own as it is. Heidegger's famous example 
of the judgment that the picture banging on the wall is crooked 
clarifies his point. The judgment is confirmed ('Behold so it is!'). 
But what is thus shown by this 'demonstration'? Agreement 
between cOgnition and thing? Yes and no. It is not, as in some 
forms of 'correspondence,' a relation of myself to a mental 
representation. The true relation of knowing must be to the 
23 lbid., pp. 257-258. 
29 Ibid., p. 260. 
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actual picture on the wall, the showing of the thing-in-itseIf. Thus 
assertion or judgment is a way of 'Being towards the Thing itself 
that is' in such a way that 'this Being is the very entity which one 
bas in mind in one's assertion,' and that 'such Being (towards) 
WICOVers the entity towards which it is.'3O What is to be positively 
demonstrated then is only the 'Being-uncovered (Entdecktsein) 
of the entity itself-that entity in the "how" of its uncovered-
ness.'31 In thus concluding that 'Being-true' means 'Being-
uncovering,' disclosing the entity as it is, Heidegger has not at all 
sought to overthrow the 'correspondence' conception of truth but 
bas sought to expand the notion of correspondence truth by 
showing that correspondence truth is rooted in and from a more 
original (primordial) Truth (a1etheia as dis-c1osure, un-veiling, 
un-covering) which is the 'condition' and basis of true cor-
respondence. It is this way of Being (as logos) which Dasein can 
either authentically 'uncover' or 'cover up.' Truth as dis-closure is 
the ontological condition for the possibility that assertions can be 
either true or false.32 
V. 'TnIth as Disclosure' and ChrIstian Theology: The Case 
of Thomas Forsyth TolTance 
Thomas Torrance's response to and careful but formative use of 
Martin Heidegger's understanding of Truth as dis-cIosure bas 
,. Ibid., pp. 260-261. 
31 Ibid. 
" Ibid., p. 269. Though making a somewhat different contextual point, Hubert 
L. Dreyfus strongly confinns this inteJpretation of Heidegger's onto~ 
understanding aod undergirding of Truth and a proper (critical) reaIism 
when he states that 'Many intetpreters, however, understand Heidegger as 
holding the instrumentalist view that scientific entities are social constructions 
essentially related to hwnan pwposes, or else a fonn of operationalism 
equation scientific entities with their intraworldly effects or measurements. 
Such fonns of antirealism, as Arthur Fine puts it, 'accept the behaviorist idea 
that the working practices of conceptual exchange eshaust the meaning of the 
exchange, having it its si$ificance and providing it with its context.' But 
Heidegger never concluded from the fact that our practices are necessary for 
access to theoretical entities that these entities must be defined in terms of our 
access practices ... in Being and Time Heidegger is what one might call a 
minimIil henneneutic reaJist concerning nature aod the objects of natural 
science, and that he remained such in his later work, even when he became 
severe1y critical of the understanding of being underlying scientific research 
aod technology.' Hubert L Dreyfus, 'Heidegger's Henneneutlc Realism,' in 
The Interpretive Thm: Philosophy, Sclence, Culture, David R. Hiley, James F. 
Bolunan, aod Richard Shusterman, eds. (Ithaa, N.Y.: ComelI University Press, 
1991), pp. 26-27. 
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apparently gone lar!!;ely unnoticed. Torrance understands Hei-
degger's concept otTruth (aletheia) to be not so much the 
'condition' and basis/ground of correspondence (and coherence) 
truth but more the very heart of correspondence truth. As such 
he finds that Heidegger's understanding of Truth as 'dis-closure' 
has many significant implications for theological knowledge of 
the objective self-giving of God in his Word. 
Thrrance's response to Heidegger's thought is admittedly 
mixed. Negatively, Torrance believes that Heidegger, like Kant, is 
to be faulted for finally denying that genuine knowledge in eve2: 
proper field of inquiry is established in terms of the object s 
actual, internal relations with real intelligihility (including 
theo~ogy).33 In Heidegger, T~rrance sees finally a dualist leap into 
nothing as a result of havmg lost the eternal-temporal inter-
activity (cf. his lengthy criticisms of the destructive modern 
dualisms of and from Descartes, Newton and Kant). Torrance 
finds that despite important advances Heidegger falls back. from 
ontology to existentialism because he work.s with a non-
conceptual relation to being as a result of the fact that logns is not 
properly understood as inhering in being and therefore cannot be 
~n~ grasped. Heidegger can only think. of letting being 
~lose 1tse~thr~lUgh a non-conceptualleap into that nothing. In 
this way he IS said finally to fall back. upon himself and his own 
self-understanding.34 
Yet Torrance also finds Heidegger's insights into realist thought 
and truth to be of great importance. Going back. even to 
Heidegger's dissertation on Duns Scotus, Torrance contends that 
he rightly traced the difficulties of Western philosophy back. to the 
false separation of thought from reality and the ascendancy of 
abstract formalization over nature, all of which Heidegger 
learned from Scotus. From Scotus, he is also said to have been 
infl~enced to~ard a negative reaction to Aquinas' form of 
realism. Also like Scotus, Heidegger has endeavored to establish a 
more properly realist epistemology wherein room is made for a 
J3 Thomas Forsyth Torrance, The Ground and Grammar <if ~ (Char-
lottesville: The University Press of Vu-ginia, 1980), p. 42. Hereafter GG. Cf. 
Thomas F. Torrance, Space, Time antf Reswnctfon (Grand Rapids: WIn B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1975), p. 151. Hereafter SrR. Cf. Robert P. 
Scbarlemann, The Being of God, Theology and the Experience of Truth (New 
,. York: The Seabury Press, 1981), chapters two and three. 
Thomas F. TOITance, Tram;formation and Convergence In tru. Frame of 
Knowlet:\ge (Grand Rapids: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishin!!: Company, 1984), p. 
309. Hereafter TCFK. Cf. TOlTance, RST (Edinbmgb: The Scottish Academic 
Press, 1981), p. 49. 
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direct relation between mind and being. Heidegger's belief in the 
openness of nature to empirical investigation of its intrinsic 
relations and rational order is said by Torrance to have thus been 
much influenced by Scotus' realism. It is as a result of this 
iI;ldirect influence that Torrance interprets Heidegger as seeking 
to clarif)r his critical realist concern regarding the Western 
separation of logns from physis.35 In calling attention to the 
problem of such a false and damaging severance, Heidegger is 
said to have revealed appropriate concern for detachment of 
thought from being. WIlen such a 'split' occurs, subjectivistic 
human thinking then develops dictatorial, legislative habits of 
thought which attempt to impose nomistic structures upon 
being.36 
According to Torrance, Heidegger desired that thought again 
approach being appropriately in accord with being's own interior 
principles of activity and powers of communication and significa-
tion whereby propositions are true only when manifesting being's 
own intention. In this way, objective modes of thought are 
correlated with the ultimate openness of being and its semantic 
reference. It is here that Torrance is especially interested in 
Heidegger's analysis and interpretation of aletheia.· Heidegger is 
found to let being itself show through in its own freedom and 
realily. In relating logos and physis, Torrance understands 
Heidegger to correctly perceive that losos is the natural force of 
being by which it manifests itself, by which it comes out into the 
open and shows itself in its own light. Logos immanent in being 
is not seen to be itself the locus of truth, but 'is the manifesting of 
the reality of things or their unconcealment (aletheia).'37 Tor-
rance finds it significant that Heidegger's understanding of Truth 
has no need for intermediary representations, which happens 
whenever logos is separated dualistically from being. This is 
because the actual concern is with the showing of reality itself to 
the human knower, which is why Heidegger gave so much effort 
to the analysis of 'existence' (Dasein) in order to destroy the false 
ontologies which arise by means of the verification of substitute-
symbolisms. This was done in order that the entire focus of 
35 Ibid., p. 1. 
36 Thomas F. TOITance, Theological &ience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1969), p. 252. Hereafter 1'5. Cf. Torrance, GG, p. 81, as he follows Heidegger 
and the description of how logos became s~ated from being and how-this 
led to the attempt to throw a 'logical bridge,' natural theolOgy (a priori) 
between knoMedge of this world and knowledge of God. 
37 Torrance, RST, p. 47. cr. Torrance, Theol~ in Reconstruction (Grand Rapids: 
Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1965), pp. 17-18. Hereafter TRst. 
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attention would be directed upon being in the full and proper 
sense (&in)."" Despite perceived problems, then, Heidegger is still 
found by Torrance to have brought to prelinrinary corrective 
clarity the need to allow reality to unveil itself in its own inner 
intelligibility (aletheia). Torrance says that thinking must be 
thrust up against the truth of being in such a way that it is 
'sustained by an objective signification and does not fall back into 
the dark whirlpool of man's self-understanding ... we grasp the 
truth of intelligible being out of the depth of its own reality, but 
we let it interpret itself to US.'39 Building upon Heidegger, then, 
Torrance says that 'if (these structures or modes or thought) 
serve the uncovering of being, let it show itself or come to view or 
stand out in its reality, then they are true, but if they obscure 
being or distort its showing forth by imposing ... an alien 
structure of meaning ... they are false.''" Heidegger's under-
standing of a-/etheia or 'unconcealment' of being is highly 
regarded by Torrance and developed in a way which reflects 
Torrance's own emphasis on the disclosure and the realist 
knowledge of objective being as correspondent as well as 
coherent. Only in this way, he says, can objectivity and ontology 
(the truth of beinglBeing) be recovered. 
Basically, Torrance understands truth to denote a state of 
affatrs which is necessarily and ontologically prior to the truth of 
cognition or statement. The truth of being is basically synonym-
ous with objective reality as it is dis-closed to be known. As with 
Augustine, the truth is 'what is' or 'that which manifests what is 
... and manifests it as it is.' Truth is said to enshrine at once 'the 
real being of things and the revelation of things as they are in 
reality. '41 As a result, thought and statement refer beyond 
themselves and this is said to cIariJY scientific activity in theology. 
In this, the knowledge of God as he is out of hirnseIf means that 
human thought of God is thrown back upon God as its direct and 
proper Object. Thought is brought increasingly into accord with 
God as he is in his personal movement of disclosure, and thereby 
as he is in himself. We are addressed by the compelling Word of 
God's openness to be known in his 'unconcealedness' in Christ, 
and then summoned to faithful and disciplined response in the 
exercise of reason.42 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., p. 48. 
40 Ibid., p. 49. Cf. Torrance, God and Rationality (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1971), pp. 177-178. 
41 Ibid., p. 141. 
42 Torrance, TS, pp. xii-xiii. 
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Torrance is clear in his belief that behind all correspondent 
truth of knowing there stands the Truth of God, Truth as 
Personal Being. which bas taken the fonn of active life in human 
historical existence inJesus Christ. He is the Truth of the Father. 
InJesus Christ, God 'turns in Grace toward us and makes Himself 
open to us . . . (bearing) directly upon us with theJ'resence and 
impact of ultimate Truth.'43 Theology is concerne strictly with 
the ultimate Objectivity of God who personally comes and 
impresses his Truth in openness upon our thought, which then 
has a corresponding conception of Truth and which is, in that 
sense and in that measure, not provisional but ultimate. God's 
Truth is his Word which is his own Person in self-
communication. God's Truth is the.communication of himself 
which is not apart from truths. But such truths must cohere in 
the one Person of the incarnate Word of God in dialogical relation 
with human knowing for faithful response. In this God-
established knowing relation in Christ by the Spirit there is 
adaptation of human thought and human thea-lOgical expression 
in accordance with the creative, revealing and saving acts of God 
among human beings. Therefore, thea-logical thought and 
statement which would be faithful to its proper object must have 
a logic of reference which does 'correspond to the logic of God's 
self-communication to men-and correspond is here the 
appropriate tenn.' In theo-logical sctence, Torrance is not merely 
concerned with human reference to divine Being. but with 
redemptive knowledge of the living God in Christ and by the 
Spirit, with the responsive correspondence of human thought and 
word to the divine Word, and human act with the divine Act in 
accord with faith-ful sctentific process. Human theological state-
ments arising responsively out of God's ultimate Truth will then 
not be ultimate and final. Theological statements must refer 
away from themselves and away from human subjectivity, 
beyond, to the 'level' of ultimate Truth which has ontological 
priority." As an ongoing process of conformation, adaptation or 
correspondence to the Truth of God in its own objective, inner 
coherence, sctentific clarification and progressive development 
ensues in theological understanding and so in theological state-
ments/disclosure models in the context of that faith knowing. 
In theological sctence, in the pursuit of the theological task 
which arises in and from the object knowing relation with God in 
Christ, Thrrance advocates that correspondence and coherence 
" Ibid., pp. 142-143. 
.. Ibid., pp. 231..,232. Cf. p. 145. 
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be finally integrated, for to know God in a realist way means that 
one ('by the Spirit and through the Word') faithfulJy 'follows' or 
'thinks after' the objective disclosure (a-letheia) of God's Word in 
Christ in God's ' economic' coming, and finally into God's own 
internal rationality and coherence as it is in the eternal relations 
within the 'ontological' Trinity. Onl'l in this way may theology 
serve the objective self-disclosure 0 God in Christ by the Spirit, 
serve as an opening for rather than a barrier to God's self-giving 
to and in the world, serve as a reponsive speaking which, by the 
utter grace of God and at its own human 'level,' corresponds to 
the real knowledge of the triune God in the person of the 
Savior. 
VI. Conclusion 
Thus contrary to much interpretation and use of Martin Heideg-
ger's understanding of 'Truth as dis-closure,' Heidegger had no 
intention of den;0;','g or doing away with or belittling 'truth as 
correspondence. Rather his purpose was to clarifjr the founda-
tion and to undergird such a knowing relation. Thomas Torrance 
has not only recognized that this was Heidegger's goal but has 
made Heidegger's understanding of a-letheia, 'Truth as dis-
closure,' the very center and basis of his own understanding and 
expression of (critical) realist human knowing of objectively given 
truth, particularly the Truth of the triune God who has graciously 
given himself to be known as he is in the Word made flesh, Jesus 
Christ, and in the power of the Holy Spirit. In this way, Torrance 
has truly 'un-covered' the possibilities of Heidegger's 'cor-
respondent' theo-logical usefulness for Christian theology, and, 
most helpfully, the way of the Truth of God for human 
redemption. 
Abstract 
Within the context of Thomas Torrance's larger concern to 
critique the re-entrencbment of phllosophical (epistemological) 
dualism in theology specifically and culture generally, there lies 
his desire to re-establish a proper understanding of 'correspond-
ence truth.' There have been multiple viewpoints on truth which 
have been clustered under the heading 'correspondence.' Yet, 
contrary to the sweep of interpretation of Martin Heidegger's 
~, Torrance takes the Heidegganian view of truth as 'dis-
closure, the disclosure of Being (a-fetheia) to be the very heart of 
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a proper reckoning of correspondence truth and as essential to 
his own critical realist theology. Specifically, 'truth as dis-closure,' 
properly understood, not only brings healing to the epistemo-
lOgical split resulting from disjunctive, dualist perspectives, but is 
the basis of Torrance's emphasis on the Truth of the triune God 
who has graciously given hlmself to be known as he is in the 
Word made flesh, Jesus Christ, and in the power of the Holy 
Spirit. 
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